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PHOTO ID, PROVISIONAL BALLOTING, AND
INDIANA'S 2012 PRIMARY ELECTION
Michael J. Pitts *
It probably is not too much hyperbole to say that photo identifi-
cation was the election administration story of the 2012 election
cycle.' Following the Republican tidal wave takeover of numerous
state legislatures in 2010, several state legislatures either passed
new photo identification laws or upgraded existing voter identifi-
cation laws to require photo identification.2 To take one example,
Pennsylvania (which may well have been the eye of the photo
identification hurricane) featured a high-profile court battle over
its adoption of a photo identification requirement.'
* Professor of Law & Dean's Fellow, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School
of Law. J.D., 1999, Georgetown University Law Center; B.S.J., 1993, Northwestern Uni-
versity. Many thanks to Erin Radefeld for outstanding research assistance.
1. Throughout this article, I generally use the term "photo identification" rather than
"voter identification." The reason I do so is that there is actually very little controversy
about voter identification generally. Rather, the flashpoint of dispute in relation to voter
identification is when states adopt laws that essentially exclusively require a government-
issued photo identification as a condition of casting a "regular" (as opposed to a "provision-
al") ballot at a polling place.
2. In 2011, Kansas, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin enacted photo identification laws,
citizens in Mississippi adopted a photo identification law through referendum, and Ala-
bama, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas tightened their existing voter identification
laws. See Voter ID: Where Are We Now?, 29 THE CANVASS 1, 2 (Apr. 2012), available at
www.ncsl.org/documents/legismgt/elect/canvassApr_2012_No_29.pdf. In 2012, Pennsyl-
vania added a new photo identification law and Minnesota placed a constitutional
amendment to add a photo identification requirement on the 2012 ballot. See id. One ex-
ception to the general rule-that photo identification laws only generally get adopted by
states when Republicans hold both the executive and legislative branches-is Rhode Is-
land, where a photo identification law was adopted even though Democrats controlled the
state legislature. Philip Marcelo, Katherine Gregg & Randal Edgar, R.I. Voter-ID Law
Hailed at U.S. Senate Hearing, PROVIDENCE J., Sept. 12, 2011, at 5; Rhode Island Gover-
nor Signs Voter ID Bill, REUTERS, July 6, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/
06/us-rhodeisland-voterid-idUSTRE7656RS20110706.
3. Karen Langley, Voting Law Experts Keep Close Eye on Pennsylvania, PITTSBURGH
POST-GAZETrE (Aug. 11, 2012) www.post-gazette.com/storiesllocal/state/voting-law-ex
perts-keep-close-eye-on-pennsylvania-648506/ (mentioning state court battle over Penn-
sylvania's photo ID law).
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With all the hullabaloo over photo identification around the na-
tion in the past couple of years-from Pennsylvania to Texas to
Wisconsin and elsewhere-it is easy to forget that the crossroads
of photo identification is Indiana. Indiana was on the forefront of
adopting photo identification-doing so in 2005-meaning that
Indiana has implemented photo identification at its polls since
2006.4 In addition, the basic framework of Indiana's photo identi-
fication law has served as the model for other state photo identifi-
cation laws.5 For these reasons, Indiana perhaps presents the
best laboratory for examining a photo identification law's impact
on an electorate.
This article represents the continuation of a series of studies
that measure the impact of photo identification on the electorate
by examining provisional ballots cast and not counted because
prospective voters lacked photo identification. Prior studies exam-
ined provisional balloting at Indiana's 2008 primary and 2008
general elections.6 This article will present results from the 2012
primary and will proceed in two parts. Section I will briefly dis-
cuss the details of Indiana's photo identification law, the various
methods used to measure the impact of photo identification laws
generally, and the research methods employed for this study. Sec-
tion II will present and analyze the empirical data generated in
this study and, notably, compare the impact of the photo identifi-
cation law at Indiana's 2008 primary election with the impact of
the photo identification law at Indiana's 2012 primary election.
I. MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF PHOTO IDENTIFICATION
GENERALLY AND IN INDIANA
The first thing that's important in assessing the impact of In-
diana's photo identification law is to understand how the photo
identification law works. I have previously provided very detailed
4. Act of Apr. 27, 2005, P.L. 109-2005, 2005 Ind. Acts 2005. Georgia adopted a photo
identification law almost simultaneously with Indiana. Act of Apr. 22, 2005, no. 53, 2005
Ga. Laws 253.
5. See Michael J. Pitts & Matthew D. Neumann, Documenting Disfranchisement:
Voter Identification During Indiana's 2008 General Election, 25 J.L. & POL. 329, 331
(2009) (citing ALEC EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE 135 (2009)).
6. See generally id. at 329; Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Pho-
to Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J.L. &
POL. 475 (2008) [hereinafter Assessing the Impact].
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synopses of the mechanics of Indiana's law elsewhere,7 and I will
not extensively repeat those details. For present purposes, the
most important aspects of Indiana's photo identification law are
as follows:
ED With only very limited exceptions, prospective voters who
present themselves at Indiana's polls on Election Day must show
a photo identification issued by the State of Indiana or the federal
government that:
* Has an expiration date and is not expired or is only very
recently expired;8 and,
* Contains the prospective voter's name, with the name
on the photo identification conforming to the name in the
poll book (i.e., an exact match between the name on the
photo identification and the name in the poll book is not re-
quired).'
El If a prospective voter appears at Indiana's polls without a
valid photo identification, the prospective voter may cast a provi-
sional ballot. °
DI If a prospective voter casts a provisional ballot due to a lack
of photo identification, the prospective voter has a ten-day win-
dow after the election to have the ballot counted in the final tally
of votes by either:"
* Returning to the county election office and showing a
valid photo identification; 2 or
* Returning to the county election office and signing an
affidavit that asserts inability to obtain a photo identifica-
tion because of indigency or because of a religious objection
to being photographed. 3
11 While most prospective voters on Election Day must show a
7. See, e.g., Assessing the Impact, supra note 6, at 481-85; see also Antony Page &
Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias,
15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 14-20 (2009).
8. IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5(a)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
9. Id. § 3-5-2-40.5(a)(1)-(2).
10. Id. § 3-11-8-25.1(c)-(d) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
11. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a)-(b) (Repl. Vol. 2011).
12. See id.
13. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a), (c).
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photo identification, persons who cast an absentee ballot by mail
do not have to present photo identification. 4 While not every reg-
istered voter is eligible to vote absentee by mail, two major cate-
gories of such eligible voters are the elderly and persons with dis-
abilities."'
In short, as a general matter, to cast a countable ballot on Elec-
tion Day in Indiana, a person must show a valid photo identifica-
tion or, in the alternative, a prospective voter can cast a provi-
sional ballot and journey to the local election office within a short
time after the election to validate that provisional ballot.
In addition to Indiana's photo identification law, there is an-
other identification requirement in play at Indiana's polls on
Election Day that is necessary for a complete understanding of
the research presented here. The federal Help America Vote Act
("HAVA") essentially requires first-time voters who register by
mail (and who do not provide proof of identification as part of
their registration application) to provide proof of identification at
the polls. 6 However, the HAVA identification requirement differs
from Indiana's photo identification requirement in a number of
key ways. First, the HAVA identification requirement applies to a
much more limited class of prospective voters-first-time regis-
trants by mail rather than all prospective voters who appear at a
polling place." Second, the HAVA identification requirement can
be fulfilled by a prospective voter providing something other than
a photo identification, allowing, among other things, a prospective
voter to satisfy the requirement by showing a government check
or a utility bill. 8 Third, the HAVA identification requirement re-
quires the identification presented by the prospective voter to
have an address that exactly matches the address in the poll
book; 9 in contrast, Indiana's photo identification law contains no
such address match requirement. Importantly, the bottom line is
that it is possible (though perhaps unlikely) for a prospective vot-
er at an election in Indiana to be able to meet the state photo
14. Id. § 3-11-10-24(c) (Repl. Vol. 2011) (laying out the requirements for voters who
cast absentee ballots by mail).
15. Id. § 3-11-10-24(a)(4)-(5).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(b)(1)-(2)(A) (2006).
17. Id. § 15483(b).




identification requirement but not the HAVA identification re-
quirement or vice versa."0
For several years now, debate has raged over the impact of
photo identification laws, such as Indiana's, on the electorate.
Supporters of photo identification laws (who generally are Repub-
lican politicians and their supporters) assert that photo identifi-
cation laws act as a bulwark to prevent voter fraud.21 Opponents
of photo identification laws (who generally are Democratic politi-
cians and their supporters) assert that photo identification laws
target a non-problem-in-person voter fraud-and lead to vast
disfranchisement.22 Obviously, the finer points of the debate be-
come more nuanced, but these are the broad strokes of the con-
tentions made by the sides engaged in what Professor Richard
Hasen calls the "Voting Wars."2
For the past several years, this debate has raged (and contin-
ues to rage) in somewhat of an empirical vacuum. Supporters of
photo identification laws have generally not been able to generate
many examples of in-person voter fraud, either in recent elections
or historically. For instance, in the most prominent United States
Supreme Court case on photo identification, the lead opinion au-
thored by Justice John Paul Stevens struggled to cite to firm ex-
amples of in-person voter fraud.24 On the other side of the coin,
opponents of photo identification laws have had trouble proving
that there are actual persons who would be disfranchised by pho-
to identification laws. 5
This article expands empirical knowledge on the access (i.e.,
disfranchisement) side of the access versus integrity (i.e., fraud)
photo identification debate. Before describing this particular
study though, it is useful to briefly survey the other types of em-
pirical research that have been employed in an attempt to meas-
ure the disfranchising impact of photo identification laws.
20. For more details and examples of how this works, see Assessing the Impact, supra
note 6, at 485.
21. See, e.g., RICHARD L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS 6 (2012).
22. See id.
23. See generally id.
24. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 195 nn.11-12 (2008)
(plurality opinion) (citing just a single modern example of in-person voter fraud in the
State of Washington and one historical example of in-person voter fraud from the 1860s).
25. Id. at 200-02 (citations omitted).
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One possible method to assess the disfranchising impact of
photo identification laws is through analysis of voter turnout da-
ta. For instance, one study analyzed Indiana elections and found
that turnout actually increased after implementation of the photo
identification law.26 In contrast, other studies, while not neces-
sarily focused on photo identification laws or Indiana in particu-
lar, have suggested that stricter voter identification requirements
do reduce turnout.2 ' However, these studies of overall voter turn-
out may not be very helpful in assessing the impact of photo iden-
tification laws, because there may be insurmountable difficulties
in using voter turnout data to estimate the impact of voter identi-
fication laws. 8
The main empirical data used by opponents of photo identifica-
tion laws to determine these laws' disfranchising impact
measures access to identification among the potential electorate.
The expert report submitted on behalf of plaintiffs in the Penn-
sylvania photo identification litigation serves as a paradigmatic
example of such a study.29 That report contained the results of a
survey of Pennsylvania voters that had three primary goals: first,
to determine the number of potential voters who did not have a
photo identification that would meet the requirements of Penn-
sylvania's law; second, to determine the number of registered vot-
ers who did not have a photo identification that would meet the
requirements of the law; and, third, to determine the number of
persons who cast ballots in 2008 who did not have a photo identi-
fication that would meet the requirements of Pennsylvania's
law. The report concluded that in Pennsylvania, 14.4% of eligi-
ble voters (1,364,433 persons), 12.8% of registered voters
(1,055,200 persons), and 12.6% of those who voted in 2008
(757,325 persons) lacked proper photo identification.'
26. JEFFREY MILYO, INST. OF PUB. POLICY, THE EFFECTS OF PHOTOGRAPHIC
IDENTIFICATION ON VOTER TURNOUT IN INDIANA: A COUNTY-LEVEL ANALYSIS 4-5 (2007).
27. EAGLETON INST. OF POLITICS & MORITZ COLL. OF LAW, REPORT TO THE U.S.
ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMMISSION ON BEST PRACTICES TO IMPROVE VOTER
IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS PURSUANT TO THE HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT OF 2002,
PUBLIC LAW 107-252, at 23 (2006).
28. See generally Robert S. Erikson & Lorraine Minnite, Modeling Problems in the
Voter Identification-Voter Turnout Debate, 8 ELECTION L.J. 85, 87 (2009).
29. See Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs at 11, Applewhite v. Com-
monwealth, No. 330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 3332376 (Pa. Commw. Ct. July 16, 2012).
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id. at 4.
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There is a decent chance, however, that these studies overstate
the amount of disfranchisement caused by photo identification
laws. For starters, these surveys tend to overstate the number of
persons who lack photo identification because many such laws
such as Pennsylvania's (and Indiana's as well) do not require an
exact match of the name on the photo identification with the
name in the poll book and only require that the name on the pho-
to identification conform to the name in the poll book.32 However,
the Pennsylvania expert report classifies persons who fail to have
an exact name match as not having a photo identification that
meets the law's requirements.33 In addition, these types of studies
rely on voters to self-report their registration status and voting
history, and such surveys tend to be less than reliable.34 Finally,
these studies do not indicate how many persons can utilize any of
the exceptions or work-arounds that can be available for prospec-
tive voters who do not have adequate photo identification. For in-
stance, in Pennsylvania (as well as in Indiana) elderly voters who
lack photo identification can avoid the requirement by casting an
absentee ballot by mail.35
A similar method of examining the impact of photo identifica-
tion on the electorate is to compare voter registration lists to
state photo identification databases. For instance, consider evi-
dence proffered in Texas v. Holder, in which the federal govern-
ment sought to prove that Texas' photo identification law violated
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. 6 In that case, the United
States presented expert testimony that compared Texas' voter
registration lists with Texas' identification card and concealed
carry databases in an effort to determine whether persons on the
voter registration list had one of these forms of photo identifica-
tion.37
32. 25 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 2602(z.5) (West 2005); IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5(a)(1)-(2)
(Repl. Vol. 2012).
33. Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of Plaintiffs, supra note 29, at 9.
34. See, e.g., Richard Sobel, Voter-ID Issues in Politics and Political Science, 42 PS:
POL. SC. & POL. 81, 83 (2009) ("[Pleople do not always accurately report voting ... ").
35. Bob Warner, Absentee Ballots May Offer A Way Around Pennsylvania Voter ID
Law, PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 5, 2012, at B01; see supra note 15 and accompanying text
(discussing Indiana's law).
36. No. 12-cv-128 (DST, RMC, RLW), 2012 WL 3743676, at *1, *7 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2012).
37. Id. at *19. Voter identification litigation in Wisconsin also used a similar type of
evidence to assess photo identification's potential impact in that state. See NAACP v.
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The federal district court, however, was skeptical of this evi-
dence and ultimately rejected the expert testimony.38 For starters,
the district court rejected this evidence because it failed to com-
pare the voter registration list with all the potential identifica-
tions that could be used to satisfy Texas' photo identification re-
quirement.39  For example, the expert testimony failed to
determine whether a registered voter who did not have a state
photo identification also did not have, say, a United States pass-
port or military identification. 4 Second, these databases often
need to be cleaned prior to performing a match and sometimes
the cleaning of these databases does not make sense.4 For in-
stance, in the Texas case, deceased persons were removed from
the state identification database but not from the registration
list. 42 Third, the database matching often requires an exact match
between the name in the voter registration list and the name in
the state identification database; however, the photo identifica-
tion laws generally do not require an exact match between the
name on the state photo identification and the name in the voter
registration list.43 In short, trying to assess disfranchisement by
determining how many registered voters do not have a qualifying
photo identification is difficult.
Yet another way of studying the amount of disfranchisement
caused by photo identification laws would be to gauge the number
of persons who were deterred from even going to the polls in the
first place by photo identification laws. These studies, which rely
on voter surveys, tend to be few and far between. One such study
is the 2008 Survey of the Performance of American Elections."4 In
a prior article, I extensively critiqued this particular study," so I
will only repeat one of those critiques here: that study did not
find a single person in Indiana who reported that not having
proper voter identification was the reason for avoiding the polls,
46
Walker, No. 11 CV 5492, slip op. at 6 (Wis. Cir. Ct. Mar. 6, 2012).
38. Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *20-21.
39. Id. at *20.
40. See id.
41. See id. at *21.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. R. MICHAEL ALVAREZ ET AL., 2008 SURVEY OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN
ELECTIONS 59 (2009).
45. Pitts & Neumann, supra note 5, at 344-45 (footnotes omitted).
46. ALVAREZ ET AL., supra note 44, at 66. I previously noted that one of the difficulties
[Vol. 47:939
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despite the fact that Indiana's photo identification law is consid-
ered to be one of the strictest in the United States."
As will be described in a bit more detail momentarily, the ap-
proach used in assessing disfranchisement in this article is differ-
ent from these other research approaches in that this research
examines disfranchisement by assessing provisional ballots cast
and not counted at an election because of the prospective voter's
failure to produce identification. While concededly this approach
has its own flaws," my view is that this type of research provides
the most solid evidence of actual disfranchisement caused by pho-
to identification laws. That said, none of this discussion of the
various attempts to measure the disfranchising impact of photo
identification laws in Indiana or elsewhere is intended to sully
other types of research. Indeed, all of these different approaches
merit consideration as part of the empirical puzzle of assessing
the disfranchising impact of photo identification. My main point
is that there are many pieces to the empirical puzzle and, to the
extent that we are seeking the most concrete evidence of disfran-
chisement, that evidence would seem to be found in provisional
ballots cast and not counted because the prospective voter lacked
photo identification.
This study examines the impact of a photo identification law by
examining provisional ballots cast at the May 8, 2012, primary
election in Indiana. In conducting this research, the following
basic steps were followed:
D1 The CEB-9 form filed by each of Indiana's ninety-two counties
was obtained from the Indiana Election Division. The CEB-9 form
is a report filed by each county after an election that provides
basic data for the election. For purposes of this study, the CEB-9
with these surveys is that they generally do not isolate photo identification as the sole rea-
son for the prospective voters being deterred from going to the polls. Pitts & Neumann,
supra note 5, at 345 (footnote omitted). For instance, persons will respond that they did
not cast a ballot because they both did not like the candidates and because they lacked
photo identification. Indeed, a federal court also recently recognized this very problem
with these sorts of surveys. Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *17 (citations omitted).
47. See Frederic Charles Schaffer & Tova Andrea Wang, Is Everyone Else Doing It?
Indiana's Voter Identification Law in International Perspective, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV.
397, 397 (2009) (noting that "opponents believe that the Indiana [photo identification] law
will inflict the most widespread disfranchisement" of any state's voter identification law).
48. For instance, this approach does not capture those persons without a photo identi-
fication who were not offered a provisional ballot by a poll worker or who did not accept a
provisional ballot offered by a poll worker.
2013]
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form contains three important pieces of information for each
county: (1) the total number of ballots cast; (2) the total number
of provisional ballots cast; and (3) the total number of provisional
ballots counted. The numbers provided by each county on its
CEB-9 are reported in Appendix A.4s
L] A public records request was made to each of Indiana's ninety-
two county clerks to request all documents related to provisional
balloting."
El Follow-up emails and phone calls were made to secure respons-
es to the public records request from each county.5 In some in-
stances, there were discrepancies between what a county reported
to the state on its CEB-9 form regarding the total provisional bal-
lots cast and/or counted and what the county provided in terms of
documents in response to the public records request. When dis-
crepancies arose, attempts were made to contact county officials
to resolve those discrepancies. Ultimately, we obtained responses
from all ninety-two counties."2
] I undertook a review of the provisional balloting documents ob-
tained from the counties to determine (1) the total number of pro-
visional ballots cast, (2) the total number of provisional ballots
counted, (3) the total number of photo identification-related pro-
visional ballots cast, (4) the total number of photo identification-
49. For the primary election, ninety-one of Indiana's ninety-two counties filed a CEB-
9. Blackford County did not.
50. There are three basic documents related to provisional balloting in Indiana: the
PRE-4, PRO-10, and PRO-2 forms. The PRE-4 form is filled out by the prospective voter
and the poll workers. Assessing the Impact, supra note 6, at 515-16. Importantly for pur-
poses of this research, the PRE-4 contains a box that a poll worker can check off to indi-
cate that the reason for the casting of the provisional ballot is a lack of photo identification
or a lack of HAVA identification. Id. at 515. The PRO-10 form is filled out by a prospective
voter who has returned to the county election office within the ten-day post-election win-
dow to validate a provisional ballot cast because of a lack of photo identification. Id. at
519. The top half of the PRO-2 form is initially filled out by the prospective voter to pro-
vide the prospective voter's name, address, and other information. Id. at 514. After the
election, the bottom half of the PRO-2 form is filled out by the county election board to in-
dicate whether the provisional ballot was counted and, if not counted, to indicate the rea-
son the provisional ballot was not counted. Id.
51. In addition to specifically requesting all PRE-4, PRO-10, and PRO-2 forms, if a
county had created a spreadsheet for the purpose of tracking provisional ballots, we also
sometimes received a spreadsheet. A few counties also provided minutes from meetings of
the local election board at which provisional ballots were discussed.
52. We obtained provisional balloting documents from all the counties that reported to
the State as having provisional ballots at the primary election. For those counties who had
reported to the State as having no provisional ballots at that election, we obtained confir-
mation that no provisional balloting documents were available.
[Vol. 47:939
PHOTO ID
related provisional ballots counted, (5) the total number of HAVA
identification-related provisional ballots cast, and (6) the total
number of HAVA identification-related provisional ballots count-
ed.
L1 Notably, a fairly conservative approach was adopted in deter-
mining what constituted a photo identification-related provisional
ballot (or HAVA identification-related provisional ballot) and
what constituted a provisional ballot that had been counted. A
provisional ballot was not determined to be related to photo iden-
tification (or HAVA identification), or to have been counted, un-
less the documents obtained from the county clearly indicated the
provisional ballot had been cast for photo identification-related
(or HAVA identification-related) reasons or been counted by the
local election board as part of the county's final canvass of votes.
Before moving on to a presentation of the results, one thing to
highlight is the unique nature of this research approach. To the
best of my knowledge, this is the first statewide examination of
the impact of a photo identification law on the electorate that re-
lies entirely on provisional balloting documents themselves. 3 Pre-
vious studies that have measured the impact of photo identifica-
tion laws by relying on provisional balloting have all been
generated, at least in part, by using survey data or self-reported
data at the county or state level.54 In contrast, the data gathered
here relies on the documents themselves. This is important be-
cause actually examining the documents likely provides a more
accurate empirical picture.5
53. In the fall of 2012, the Atlanta Journal-Constitution published a news article that
provided data on the number of provisional ballots not counted due to Georgia's photo
identification law, although it's not clear what the underlying basis was for this data.
Shannon McCaffrey, Voter Turnout Surges Amid Five-Year ID Law, ATL. J.-CONST., Sept.
3, 2012, at 1A (reporting that since its implementation in 2007, the ballots of 1586 Geor-
gians did not count because of the photo identification law, while there were 13.6 million
overall votes cast during that period).
54. See generally Pitts & Neumann, supra note 5; see also THE PEW CTR. ON THE
STATES, PROVISIONAL BALLOTS: AN IMPERFECT SOLUTION 5 (2009).
55. In the vast majority of instances, there is not much of a difference between what
the counties report to the state on their CEB-9 in terms of provisional ballots cast and
counted, and what the documents show. However, on occasion, there is a large difference.
For instance, in its CEB-9 report to the state for the 2012 primary election, Marion County
reported having 130 total provisional ballots, of which 18 were not counted. However, a
review of the actual documents showed 116 provisional ballots, of which 101 were not
counted.
2013]
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II. DATA AND ANALYSIS OF PHOTO IDENTIFICATION AND
PROVISIONAL BALLOTS AT THE 2012 INDIANA PRIMARY
The results of the research from the 2012 primary are shown in
Table A. Table A also includes a comparison of those results with
data previously obtained from the 2008 primary.6 Discussion of
these results follows. In addition, individual data for all ninety-
two counties is included in Appendix A.







Total Ballots 57  957,272 1,727,023
Total Provisional Ballots 605 2,771
Total Provisional Ballots Counted 98 752
Total ID Provisional Ballots 5  122 446
Total ID Provisional Ballots Counted 59  27 94
Provisional Ballots Cast as 0.06% 0.16%
Percentage of Total Votes
ID Provisional Ballots Cast as 0.012% 0.026%
Percentage of Total Votes
ID Provisional Ballots as a Percentage 20.1% 16.1%
of Total Provisional Ballots
Total Provisional Ballots Counted as
a Percentage of Total Provisional 16.1% 27.1%
Ballots Cast
ID Provisional Ballots Counted as
a Percentage of ID Provisional 22.1% 21.1%
Ballots Cast I
There are a number of ways in which the data from the 2008
primary and the 2012 primary elections are substantially similar.
First, in relation to the total number of ballots cast at the elec-
tion, the overall number of provisional ballots cast and the overall
number of identification-related provisional ballots cast was quite
57. The total number of ballots cast comes from the CEB-9 forms filed with the state
with the exception of the total number of ballots cast from Blackford County which comes
from the Indiana Secretary of State's website. ELECTION DIv., IND. SEC'Y OF STATE,
PRIMARY ELECTION TURNOUT AND REGISTRATION (2012), available at http://www.in.gov/
sos/elections/primaryl2/2012PrimaryElectionTurnoutandAbsenteeChart.pdf
58. The total ID provisional ballots combines the number of photo identification-
related provisional ballots cast with the number of HAVA identification-related provision-
al ballots cast. At the 2008 primary, there were 47 HAVA identification-related provisional
ballots cast. Assessing the Impact, supra note 6, at 499. At the 2012 primary, there were
10 HAVA identification-related provisional ballots cast.
59. The total ID provisional ballots counted combines the number of photo identifica-
tion-related provisional ballots counted with the number of HAVA identification-related
provisional ballots counted. At the 2008 primary, there were 16 HAVA identification-
related provisional ballots counted. Assessing the Impact, supra note 6, at 499. At the 2012
primary, there were 2 HAVA identification-related provisional ballots counted.
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small. Second, the majority of provisional ballots cast were not re-
lated to identification; they were cast for some other reason, such
as the voter's name not appearing on the registration list. Third,
most provisional ballots cast were not counted, and most identifi-
cation-related provisional ballots cast were not counted. Fourth,
the rate at which identification-related provisional ballots were
counted was very similar across the two elections with about 22%
of the identification-related provisional ballots counted in 2012
and about 21% of those provisional ballots counted in 2008.
The differences in the data from each election, though, are per-
haps more interesting. For starters, the overall number of provi-
sional ballots cast at the 2012 primary in relation to the total
number of ballots cast was far less than one would have predicted
if one had made an estimate based off the 2008 primary. While
the 2012 primary had a little more than half as many total voters
as the 2008 primary, the 2012 primary had only about one-fifth of
the total number of provisional ballots cast at the 2008 primary.
In short, the rate of provisional balloting was much lower in 2012
than it was in 2008. More specific to voter identification, the
number of identification-related provisional ballots cast also de-
creased dramatically in relation to the overall number of ballots
cast. Based upon what happened at the 2008 primary, one would
have expected a little less than 250 identification-related provi-
sional ballots to be cast at the 2012 primary. Yet, less than half
that many (122) identification-related provisional ballots were ac-
tually cast.
Lots of things might explain why the overall rate of provisional
ballots and the overall rate of identification-related ballots fell
from the 2008 primary to the 2012 primary. For instance, the re-
duced rate of provisional ballots might be explained by better
maintenance of voter registration lists by the state, by poll work-
ers taking extra steps to avoid the use of provisional ballots by di-
recting prospective voters to the correct precinct, or by prospec-
tive voters being less likely to take the time to fill out a
provisional ballot. The reduced rate of identification-related pro-
visional ballots might be explained by more persons obtaining
photo identification, by more prospective voters deciding to stay
home because they knew they did not have proper identification,




While it is not possible to definitively know what caused the
reduced rate of provisional ballots and voter identification ballots
at the 2012 primary when compared with the 2008 primary, one
obvious explanation might come from differences in the makeup
of the electorate at these elections. More specifically, perhaps the
vast partisan differences in the electorate between these elections
would explain any shifts in provisional balloting rates. The 2008
primary was overwhelmingly Democratic because the highest-
profile primary contest was the Obama-Clinton Democratic presi-
dential primary. In that primary election, there were 1,725,951
total voters with 1,278,355 (approximately 74%) votes cast in the
Democratic presidential primary. ° In contrast, the 2012 primary
was overwhelmingly Republican because the highest-profile pri-
mary contest 6' was the Lugar/Mourdock Republican Senate con-
62
test. In that primary election, there were 957,510 total voters
with 661,606 (69%) votes cast in the Republican Senate contest.
63
The vast difference in partisan makeup of the electorate-
heavily Democratic in 2008 in comparison to heavily Republican
in 2012-suggests two things. First, Democratic voters are more
likely to cast a provisional ballot than Republican voters. In other
words, leaving voter identification issues aside, for whatever rea-
son (name not on registration list, etc.), Democrats are more like-
ly to cast provisional ballots than their Republican counterparts.
Second, Democrats are more likely to have voter identification is-
sues than Republicans. While this has generally been the conven-
tional wisdom when it comes to photo identification laws-that
they bear more heavily on Democratic voters than Republican
voters64 to the best of my knowledge this is the research that
60. ELECTION Div., IND. SEC'Y OF STATE, 2008 INDIANA ELECTION REPORT (2008),
available at http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/files/AR-M550N_20120404-152743.pdf.
61. See Michael Finnegan, Lugar Loss Tempers Romney Primary Victories for GOP
Establishment, DAILY HERALD (May 8, 2012).
62. ELECTION Div., IND. SECY OF STATE, PRIMARY ELECTION TURNOUT AND
REGISTRATION (2012), available at http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/primaryl2/2012Primary
ElectionTurnoutandAbsenteeChart.pdf.
63. Election Results, IND. SEC'Y OF STATE, http://www.in.gov/apps/sos/primary/sos-pri
maryl2?page=office&countyID=- 1&partyID=-l&officeID=4&districtID=-1&districtshortvi
ewID=-1&candidate= (last visited Feb. 18, 2013).
64. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007)
(Evans, J., dissenting) ("Let's not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is
a not-too-thinly-veiled attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed
to skew Democratic.").
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most suggests this skew when it comes to actual voters at an elec-
tion.
Moving outside of an analysis of how the numbers differed from
the 2008 primary election, the research generated from the 2012
election suggests several other things. For starters, the level of
actual disfranchisement caused by photo identification laws is not
all that high in relation to the total number of votes cast. To be
fair, it is true that an examination of provisional ballots alone
does not conclusively establish the rate of actual disfranchise-
ment at an election. For instance, prospective voters without pho-
to identification may have, for example, just not shown up at the
polling place because they knew they did not have proper identifi-
cation."5 However, at least at this point, there is not a lot of solid
evidence to suggest that thousands upon thousands of voters in
Indiana are knowingly staying away from the polls due to a lack
of photo identification. Indeed, the available evidence suggests
that many Indiana residents have taken advantage of the free
identifications being handed out by the State, as the State has is-
sued more than 800,000 free photo identification cards since
2007.66
On the other hand, even though the evidence of actual disfran-
chisement remains low in relation to the total number of ballots
cast, there continue to be individuals who are unable to cast a
countable ballot due to the photo identification law. Moreover,
with the lack of evidence of actual instances of in-person voter
fraud,67 it's quite possible that even though the actual disfran-
chisement caused by photo identification on the overall electorate
is slight, the actual disfranchisement is vastly higher than the
65. Prospective voters may also either not have been offered a provisional ballot by
the poll workers or may have refused to engage in the provisional balloting process due to
the length of time that process can take. In addition, some provisional balloting materials
do not provide the reason why the provisional ballot was cast and some of these "mystery"
provisional ballots may have been cast due to a lack of photo identification.
66. Press Release, Ind. Sec'y of State, Media Information guide for Indiana 2012 Gen-
eral Election 7 (Oct. 30, 2012), available at http:/Iwww.in.gov/sosifiles/2012_General
_ElectionWithAttachmentsl0-30.pdf.
67. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 194 (2008) (plurali-
ty opinion) ("The only kind of voter fraud that [Indiana's photo ID law] addresses is in-
person voter impersonation at polling places. The record contains no evidence of any such
fraud actually occurring in Indiana at any time in its history.").
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amount of in-person voter fraud that would occur. From this per-
spective, one could easily conclude that a photo identification law
does much more harm than good.
One last point related to the count rate for identification-
related ballots in Indiana. The count rate for identification-
related provisional ballots is very low-about 80% of identifica-
tion-related provisional ballots do not get counted. This would not
seem to be a problem if one thought that most of these provisional
voters were illegitimate fraudsters. However, it seems unlikely
that persons who are engaging in voter fraud would leave a paper
trail of their fraud by filling out provisional ballots. This suggests
that perhaps the burden on the prospective voter of validating an
identification-related provisional ballot is too high and that Indi-
ana should amend this portion of its photo identification law to
reduce this burden. For example, instead of requiring a prospec-
tive voter to come back to the election office after the election to
validate the provisional ballot, perhaps local officials could create
a mechanism to validate these ballots, such as signature-
matching, to streamline this process. In other words, it may make
sense to put more of the post-election burden of validation on
election administrators rather than on the voters themselves.
III. CONCLUSION: MORE WORK TO Do
When it comes to photo identification, the empirical argument
is often based on theory rather than actual reality. For instance,
those who support photo identification laws theorize that there is
a vast opportunity for in-person voter fraud because of invalid
names on the registration list.6" On the other side, those who op-
pose photo identification laws theorize that there is a vast oppor-
tunity for disfranchisement because some registered voters do not
have photo identification.69 This article is part of a continuing pro-
ject to move beyond arguments of the opportunity for harm and
toward the actuality of the harm. Hopefully, more researchers on
both sides of the debate will move in this direction.
68. Id. at 194-98 (discussing the state's fraud prevention justification for photo ID).
Indiana's lists of registered voters included "the names of thousands of persons who had
either moved, died, or were not eligible to vote because they had been convicted of felo-
nies.'"' Id. (citation omitted).
69. Supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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Appendix A
CEB-9 CEB-9 Docu- Docu- Photo Photo HAVA
County Total Total Counted ments ments ID- ID- Total HAVA
T Total Counted Related Related Provi- Counted
Ballots Provi- Provi- Provi- Provi- Provi- Counted sionals
sionals sionals sionals sionals sionals
Adams 5449 3 0 3 0 0 0 0
Allen 46823 21 3 21 3 1 0 0 0
Bartholomew 12115 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Benton 1779 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Blackford 2,057 Not re- Not re- 0 0 0 0 0 
Ba_ ord_ 2,057_ ported ported
Boone 15226 15 15 14 1 0 0 0 0
Brown 3537 8 1 6 1 2 1 0 0
Carroll 3663 3 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Cass 6149 6 4 6 3 4 2 0 0
Clark 13001 28 17 24 13 2 1 0 0
Clay 4885 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Clinton 5730 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Crawford 1871 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Daviess 4417 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dearborn 6831 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Decatur 4487 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
DeKalb 6036 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Delaware 19724 11 Notre- 10 0 2 0 0 0
ported
Dubois 5809 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
Elkhart 23135 37 7 37 6 2 2 0 0
Fayette 3565 2 0 3 0 3 0 0 0
Floyd 9605 6 2 6 2 3 1 0 0
Fountain 3172 8 0 8 0 0 0 0 0
Franklin 3738 5 3 5 3 3 2 1 1
Fulton 2889 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Gibson 5023 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Grant 10566 4 1 3 1 1 1 0 0
Greene 5104 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hamilton 47250 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Hancock 13431 11 2 9 1 1 0 0 0
Harrison 6764 15 5 14 5 0 0 1 0
Hendricks 21863 11 1 9 1 1 0 0 0
Henry 8769 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 0
Howard 23607 10 0 7 0 1 0 0 0
Huntington 6334 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jackson 6282 2 1 3 1 1 1 0 0
Jasper 5928 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Jay 3288 5 1 5 1 1 1 0 0
Jefferson 5311 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Jennings 4740 11 9 2 0 0 0 0 0
Johnson 23350 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Knox 6559 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Kosciusko 11940 7 2 7 0 3 0 0 0
LaGrange 3952 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Lake 61270 47 5 30 2 9 0 0 0
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LaPorte 13386 5 1 4 1 0 0 1 0
Lawrence 7911 7 3 5 0 4 0 0 0
Madison 21201 10 2 9 1 5 0 0 0
Marion 129288 130 112 116 15 1 0 1 0
Marshall 6259 2 1 3 1 2 0 0 0
Martin 1916 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
Miami 4879 8 0 10 0 1 0 0 0
Monroe 15530 42 6 39 1 5 0 2 0
Montgomery 8073 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Morgan 12874 17 3 18 3 3 2 0 0
Newton 2566 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 0
Noble 6724 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Ohio 769 1 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
Orange 3561 13 0 13 0 0 0 0 0
Owen 3973 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
Parke 3329 6 1 6 1 3 1 0 0
Perry 2750 3 1 3 1 1 1 0 0
Pike 2730 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Porter 23571 11 1 11 1 5 1 0 0
Posey 3786 7 0 7 0 1 0 0 0
Pulaski 2483 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Putnam 5692 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
Randolph 5203 3 0 3 0 0 0 1 0
Ripley 4130 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Rush 3889 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
St. Joseph 32729 9 2 9 2 5 1 1 1
Scott 3995 4 1 3 1 1 0 0 0
Shelby 7040 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Spencer 2591 1 0 5 0 1 0 0 0
Starke 3693 14 3 13 3 12 2 0 0
Steuben 5847 6 4 6 4 3 3 0 0
Sullivan 3621 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Switzerland 1669 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tippecanoe 16449 21 9 21 9 2 0 0 0
Tipton 3646 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Union 919 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vanderburgh 17647 9 0 9 0 0 0 0 0
Vermillion 3211 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Vigo 15401 20 7 19 5 4 1 0 0
Wabash 5609 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warren 1584 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Warrick 8463 3 0 2 0 2 0 0 0
Washington 3604 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wayne 10446 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wells 5871 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
White 4191 2 0 2 0 0 0 1 0
Whitley 5549 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Totals 957272 668 246 605 98 112 25 10 2

